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REJOINDER:
TWAILING INTERNATIONAL LAW
James Thuo Gathii
Brad Roth's response to my Review of his book seeks to privilege
his approach to international law as the most defensible.1 His re
sponse does not engage one of the central claims of my Review - that
present within international legal scholarship and praxis is a simulta
neous and dialectical coexistence of the dominant conservative/liberal
approach with alternative or Third World approaches to thinking and
writing international law. Roth calls these alternative approaches
critical and does not consider them insightful for purposes of dealing
with issues such as anticolonialism. Roth's characterization of my Re
view as falling within critical approaches to international law seems
too quick and, in fact, fits in very nicely with neoconservative dismiss
als of the progressive left, and indeed, of Third World scholarship.
For example, the rise of the Critical Race Theory movement in
American legal academia received the sort of response that Roth gives
to my Review.2 Roth defends his formalistic and doctrinaire approach
to the study of international law, which is divorced from the social, his
torical, and political context within which international law operates.
In short, he defends international law as an iron cage of rules and doc
trines as if the law was not itself a "crucial site for the production of
ideology and the perpetuation of social power."3
Such a view of international law, or indeed any social phenome
non, simply elides the issues raised in my Review. Roth's characteri
zation of my Review as "politically dysfunctional" epitomizes his fail
ure to engage the pitfalls of formalist and doctrinaire thought in that it
fails to engage the truism that states advance their interests, in part,
through the medium of international law.4 It fails to debate whether
international law is constitutive and not merely a reflection of the hi-

1. See Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy and Neo-Colonialism: Response to Re·
view By James Thuo Gathii, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2056 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Blood and the Crits: 0. J. Simpson, Critical Race Theory,
the Law, and the Triumph of Color in America, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27.
For examples of the writings of Critical Race Theorists, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED TIIE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). For
an application of Critical Race Theory to International Law, see Ruth Gordon, Racing
American Foreign Policy, Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Inter
national Law (April 2000).
3. Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 2, at xxiv.
4. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2057.
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erarchical character of international so�iety. As such, law does not
stand outside the raw interests of states, ·but it produces those interests
as much as it is the product of them. Consequently, the characteriza
tion of my Review as politically dysfunctional is all the sadder since
any fair reading suggests otherwise. If nothing else, I engage in a care
ful and elaborate academic review of his book. I am not surprised,
though, that Third World intellectuals receive little respect from some
of their Western counterparts like Roth, even when they make credi
ble intellectual contributions. In fact, Roth claims that his book is "far
more effectively anti-colonial than ... [my] critique of it."5 What bet
ter way of denying me a voice could there be?
The essential point concerning the variety of Third World positions

that I illustrate in my Review, and which Roth misses, is that Third
World positions exist in opposition to, and as a limit on, the triumphal
universalism of the liberal/conservative consensus in international law.
In addition, these Third World positions are often shaped by the
liberal/conservative consensus as much as the liberal/conservative ap
proaches are shaped by countervailing Third World positions. A good

example of this reciprocal definition of positions is the traditional
liberal/conservative defense of the existing hierarchies of the interna
tional political economy. This defense is based on two pretexts: that
free enterprise is a given norm of the international economy and that

the Third World has an interest in subverting hierarchies and displac
ing free enterprise as a given norm of international economic relations.
This dialectic of defense and subversion was exemplified by the New
International Economic Order ("NIEO") in the 1970s. The liberal/
conservative consensus opposed the NIEO and defended free enter
prise as a basic norm of international relations, in part on the basis
that sovereignty was a political concept that could not extend to eco
nomic relations between states. This position was defined in response
to Third World challenges to foreign control over their natural re

sources without adequate compensation. It was also defined in view
of the unfair terms of international trade and commerce that devel
oping countries experience.
This example highlights my point. While the liberal/conservative

position constructs the legal framework that is consistent with the
hegemonic interests of the industrialized world, Third World positions
challenge it and suggest, contrary to the liberal/conservative position,
that a re-imagining or, indeed, revision of international economic and
legal relations would not unduly destabilize international society.
Third World scholars suggest that such a reformulation of interna
tional law might instead be one part of a larger process of creatively

5. Id. at 2057.
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addressing issues of global justice and inequality.6 Although it may
seem from this example that Third World Approaches to International
Law ("TWAIL") are diametrically opposed to the liberal/conservative
consensus, such a view understates the fact that aspects of each ap
proach inter-penetrate each other. Such interpenetration generates
creative tensions. For example, in foregrounding the interests of the
industrialized economies, liberal/conservative positions are in tension
with Third World Approaches that foreground the interests of the
non-industrialized economies. These tensions are fruitful and cannot
be ignored. As I stated in my Review, it is these new spaces generated
by the interpenetration of the West and the non-West that takes us
beyond the given grounds of opposition between Western liberalism
and Western conservatism, or even between the West and the non
West.7 These new spaces, in tum, create a new conceptual space for
revision of accepted praxis, orthodoxies, and hierarchies (be they
nonmaterial or material). These new spaces suggest that simply
grounding or locating our struggles in doctrinal and formal categories
is only part of a larger picture that cannot be completely subsumed by
such categories outside of the social processes within which they oper
ate.8
It is thus odd that Roth seems to make much of the point that his
brand of analysis is superior because it does not, like mine, abandon
"the very devices that give the poor and weak a modicum of lever
age."9 Yet, Roth does not tell us the ways in which the norms and doc
trines of international law preclude the very realization of these noble
goals. Perhaps Roth should do better than engage in a selective and
misleading characterization of not only my analysis, but of TWAIL
scholarship as well. TWAIL scholarship, like allied approaches to the
study of law, has a long tradition of examining the promises of such
concepts as the norm of sovereign equality of states against the exist
ing reality of economic hierarchy and subordination between nations.
Such an analysis does not throw legal concepts overboard, but rather
foregrounds the existing reality of economic hierarchy and subordina-

6. For some thoughts on this, see James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocen·
tricity, 9 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 184, 203-11 (1998) (reviewing SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL
POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) and SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI,
SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS (1996)).
7. See James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance:
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2001
(2000) (reviewing BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL lLLEGmMACY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1999)).
8. See James Thuo Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and
Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263
(2000).
9. Roth, supra note 1, at 2057.
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tion between nations in relation to the norm of sovereign equality.10 It
does not take any cleverness to do that and Third World scholars need
not learn this from their Western counterparts. That law legitimizes
oppressive social order is at the very center of my critique of Roth's
failure to examine how international law de-legitimated non-Western
societies as incapable of possessing sovereignty - an argument that
laid the basis for colonial conquest.
By contrast to this Third World position that expresses ambiva
lence to international legal norms and doctrines, Roth regards his in
ternational law of governmental illegitimacy as necessarily emancipa
tory. He predicates this view on at least two propositions. First,
governmental illegitimacy has the endorsement of Third World pro
gressive leaders from whom Roth has "copiously" quoted. Such lead
ers include Kwame Nkrumah, Raul Castro and Julius Nyerere.11 Sec
ond, Roth states that he is interested in serving "to the extent possible,
the long-term interests of the inhabitants of weak states."12 I do not
challenge either proposition. Yet they are both predicated on the
simplistic assumption that being "pro-small states" and "pro-left
leaning Third World leaders" is as necessarily progressive as a defense
of international legal norms and doctrines. For Roth, it is as if pro
gressives are only those allied to his position. Roth seems to suggest
that since I do not subscribe to his view of who a progressive is, I am
necessarily reactionary.13 This is a curious claim since being in the
company of Third World political leadership is hardly evidence of be
ing avant garde or progressive.14 One only has to remember that
barely ten years after the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement meeting in
Bandung, Indonesia, a country that Roth has aligned himself with,
forcibly put East Timor under its dictatorship. Hence, these responses
are inadequate for at least two further reasons. First, they fail to en
gage my primary criticisms of his book: its failure to engage the colo
nial history of the international law of governmental illegitimacy and
the
underlying
private
order
upon
which
governmental
10. One of the best Third World articulations of this theme is MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI,
TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). According to Bedjaoui,
"[t]raditional international law has helped to make independence a completely superficial
phenomenon, beneath the surface of which the old forms of domination survive and the
economic empires of the multinational corporations, and the powers that protect them,
prosper." Id. at 81.
11. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2064.
12. Id. at 2061.
13. See id. at 2064 (stating that "[i]n repudiating conventional legal analysis [which inci
dentally I do not] as Eurocentric, Gathii dismisses both the significance of Third World par
ticipation in shaping contemporary norms and the extent of the Third World's stake in the
continued vitality of these norms - an attitude not, so far as I can tell, broadly shared
among Third World leaders, scholars, or peoples.").
14. For a trenchant expose of this position, see Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A
New Form ofImperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. AsIA 159 (1995).
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legitimacy/illegitimacy is predicated. Second, they are based on very
simplistic assumptions about what is desirable for the Third World.
These assumptions fail to take into account the complex relationship
of normative and doctrinal work with the history of international law,
and the oppressive reality over which international law gives credence
at the expense of the Third World.
The lack of engagement with colonialism and the private order
that legitimates public power is not a problem specific to Roth, but
rather one associated with the triumphal universalism of the liberal/
conservative approaches of which his book is a part. The disengage
ment with these issues, in my view, characterizes an essential neo
conservative realist position. Contrary to what Roth may think, I am
not therefore mistaken in characterizing his book as a neo
conservative realist approach to international law.15 To the extent that
colonialism and the economics underlying the exercise of public power
are not a part of the discussion about legitimacy, the task of engaging
legitimacy is both incomplete and consistent with the hegemony of the
industrialized countries and their allies over the rest of the World.
The tragedy is that Roth perceives his project as striking a "blow for
anticolonialism,"16 but his book epitomizes complicity with a Western
discourse that silences issues of Western power, economic justice, and
the very neocolonialism that Roth purports to oppose. Although I do
not represent the Third World, I am from it. Needless to say, I believe
that the Third World contributes - and has indeed contributed to international legal theory as much as Roth contributes.
In conclusion, a basic problem with Governmental Illegitimacy is
that it separates political and economic liberalism in its discussion of
governmental illegitimacy. This distinction between political and eco
nomic issues is rather artificial and does not even characterize post
realist legal thought in American academia. In American academia,
legal realism has shaken the foundations of the type of conceptualist
and doctrinaire thought that Roth defends within the context of inter
national law.
Roth's work reveals the degree to which liberal/
conservative international legal writing has remained insulated and
aloof from some of the most significant developments in legal theory
in the last century. Is such aloofness accidental? Whether accidental
or not, such aloofness is ill-suited to addressing the challenges associ
ated not only with neoliberalism or globalization in mainstream par
lance, but also with issues relating to the Third World. Indeed, my
Review sought to debunk Roth's simplistic characterization of the
post-Cold War moment as if it merely could be captured as being a
clash between universalism and cultural particularism. This is a poor

15. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2061.
16. Id. at 2060.
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rehash of the Eurocentricism that characterizes much of the analysis in
the book. Instead of seeing the world through this simplistic lens, I
suggest that the post-Cold War situation is one characterized by the
recognition of multiple identities and heterogeneity, and the rejection
of universalist modes of reasoning. Such multiplicity and heterogene
ity, in turn, can best be appreciated if seen for what these identities
and, indeed, norms and doctrines of international law are: constructed
and contingent. The challenge for liberal/conservative approaches to
international law, therefore, is to engage this postcolonial predicament
rather than to defend international norms in the abstract, as Roth does
in his defense of their utility for small states. For these reasons, the
Third World has a lot to offer the First. Twailing international law
will surely continue the dialectic that my Review of Roth's book pro
voked. There is no better way of developing international legal the
ory, or even addressing substantive questions of international justice,
than through such a dialogue. That my Review has led to this dia
logue, as I intended, is therefore a welcome result.

